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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
TORTS
William E. Crawford*
JUDICIAL DRAM SHOP LAW
In Pence v. Ketchum' the Louisiana Supreme Court found a cause of
action stated by allegations that the operators of a bar served plaintiff an
excessive amount of alcoholic beverages, put her out of the bar in a helpless
state, and permitted her to attempt to cross a highway in her impaired
condition, which resulted in her injury. The court thus adopted judicially
what amounts to the germ of a "dram shop act" or "civil damage act." It
expressly overruled its earlier decision in Lee v. Peerless Insurance
Co. 2 which held that the serving of drinks to an intoxicated patron was not
the proximate cause of his subsequent injury in circumstances similar to
those of the instant case.
The court said that defendant breached at least two duties he owed to
plaintiff: (1) "the statutory duty of a retailer of alcoholic beverages not to
serve alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person and (2) the duty of a
business invitor to avoid an affirmative act increasing the peril of his
intoxicated patron." 3 The statutory duty arises from the'court's interpreta-
tion of LA. R.S. 26: 88(2), which prohibits a retailer of alcoholic beverages
from serving or selling such a beverage to an intoxicated person. The second
duty referred to by the court is derived in Louisiana from the concept of fault
under LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2315 and 2316. Under this duty, one may not
take affirmative steps to create an unreasonable risk of injury to a person that
he may be struck by an automobile enjoying the status of a business invitee
of the tortfeasor.
Based upon long-existing jurisprudence, 4 the second duty stated above
furnished a cause of action for plaintiff without the court's invoking the
statutory rule against serving drinks to an intoxicated person. The court
went further, however, and announced the new duty in Louisiana by
interpreting the liquor retailers' statute to contemplate protection of a bar
patron against the risk of harm arising from a bar owner's serving him when
he is intoxicated.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
1. 326 So. 2d 831 (La. 1976). Noted, 37 LA. L. REV. 617 (1977).
2. 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966).
3. 326 So. 2d at 835.
4. Id. at 836.
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The breach of this statutory duty occurred when the bar owner served
liquor to the intoxicated plaintiff, and was not dependent upon the subse-
quent wrongful ejectment. The wrongful ejectment is not therefore an
essential element of the action by the intoxicated patron against his supplier.
While the opinion characterized the duty against ejectment under
article 2315 as one falling into the business invitor-invitee category, it
would not seem to present a problem that a few months after the instant
decision the court in Cates v. Beauregard Electric Cooperative, Inc.,I
abolished the invitee-licensee-trespasser categories as being of little help in
applying article 2315. It may be assumed that the duty here held to come
from the business invitor-invitee relationship can be easily found to flow
from the concept of fault under the provisions of article 2315.
Since Louisiana has now entered the dram shop litigation arena, it
might be helpful to note what some other states have experienced with this
type of litigation. 6 The parties having an action for violation of the Dram
Shop Act and the damages which may be claimed vary according to statute.
The bulk of the litigation is by third persons who have been harmed by one
who is intoxicated against the supplier of intoxicants to the consumer who
perpetrated the harm. Economic loss to the family of the consumer, victims
injured by the consumer's negligent driving, and wrongful death cases are
frequently found among the claims. 7
Pence does not mention the risk of harm to third parties as falling
within the duty imposed on bar owners by the statutory prohibition against
serving an intoxicated person; however, the California court in Vesely v.
Sager8 interpreted a similar statute to include third persons in the class
protected under the statute. Thus, when a third-party case arises, our court
will probably have no trouble finding that the statute protects the third
parties as well as the intoxicated person himself.9
Notably under the language of Pence regarding the duty to avoid
creating unreasonable risk of harm to the patron by wrongful ejectment,
supplying the first excessive drink to an intoxicated patron can also be an
5. 328 So. 2d 367 (La. 1976).
6. Approximately 25 states have a Dram Shop Act. See 12 AM. JUR. Trials § 2
(1966).
7. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 538 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
8. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 95 Cal. Rep. 623, 486 P.2d 151 (1971).
9. The typical Dram Shop Act does not afford protection to the intoxicated
person but to third parties harmed as a result of the patron's intoxicated condition.
See PROSSER at 538; 45 AM. JUR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 580 (1969); 48 C.J.S.
Intoxicating Liquors § 435 (1947). In this respect, Pence goes far beyond the scope of
coverage of other states.
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actionable wrong under article 2315, without reliance on the liquor retailer's
statute. Specifically, the opinion, referring to the article 2315 duty against
wrongful ejectment, says, "the duty requires that the defendant refrain from
affirmative acts which increase the peril to his intoxicated patrons." '0 The
discussion following the quoted language deals with ejectment, but it would
not take an overly ingenious mind to interpret "affirmative act" as being the
serving of "one drink too many." Under this analysis, the duty would be
derived directly from article 2315 and would not rest upon the standard of
care borrowed from the statutory prohibition. Vesely, however, rests upon a
statutory prohibition much the same as the Louisiana statute applied in
Pence. The other significant cases advancing dram shop type liability also
have relied upon a statutory violation to find the duty of protection owed by
the defendant, even relying upon laws against serving minors.11
The nationwide expansion of liability of the suppliers of intoxicating
beverages obviously has not ended. In New Jersey, the court has said,
a jury might well determine that a social host who serves excessive
amounts of alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated minor, know-
ing the minor was about to drive a car on the public highways, could
reasonably foresee or anticipate an accident or injury as a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of his negligence in serving the minor. This
becomes devastatingly apparent in view of the ever-increasing inci-
dence of serious automobile accidents resulting from drunken
driving.' 2
The New Jersey court found comfort in a 1971 Oregon case' 3 holding
that a college social fraternity was subject to liability when, as a social host,
it provided too much whiskey for a minor who in a subsequent automobile
accident injured his guest passenger, the plaintiff.
It seems an imperceptible step, then, to move beyond the present
frontier line of a social host serving minors, which is usually prohibited by
statute, and is perhaps morally reprehensible to the potential article 2315
duty in which a social host serving an adult social guest "one too many"
thereby creates a foreseeable risk of injury to all who come within bumper
range of the drunken guest weaving his way home in his automobile.
The court in Pence went to great lengths to work last clear chance into
the action by the patron to absolve him of the contributory negligence which
10. 326 So. 2d at 836.
11. See cases cited in Pence, id. at 835.
12. Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15, 19 (1976).
13. Weiner v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Ore. 632,
485 P.2d 18 (1971).
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traditionally accompanies voluntary intoxication. A more direct and less
contorted solution would flow from defining the bar owner's duty to
encompass the risk that the intoxicated consumer would expose himself to a
harm that materialized. Taking this solution, however, might deprive the
court of some flexibility in approaching the varied factual patterns that are
sure to arise.
The decisions discussed here and in the extensive dram shop litigation
across the country expanding liability of the retailers of intoxicating
beverages seem clearly to be a deep-pocket policy move. In the personal
liability coverage under the so-called homeowner insurance package, there
is obviously another deep pocket available through many social hosts. The
pain and agony inflicted upon our society by the abuse of the consumption of
alcoholic beverages can only be classified as one of the genuine social
tragedies in history. It is a perplexing and troublesome problem to determine
how the economic loss should be borne. There is no logical stopping point at
the bar owner. The manufacturers of the intoxicating liquor can certainly be
said to put it on the market with actual knowledge of the human wreckage
that will lie around the emptied bottles. It is not suggested here that the
liability should thus be spread by the courts, but it is suggested that with the
beginning shot fired in Louisiana by Pence, the rest of the fusillade should
be discharged by the legislature in the form of comprehensive legislation.
LIABILITY OF THE STATE FOR INJURIES INFLICTED BY PENITENTIARY
INMATES ON OTHER INMATES
The deplorable human conditions of the state penitentiary have been
prominent in the news recently while under the scrutiny of the United States
District Court. In Breaux v. State, "gthe court again faced the outgrowth of
sufficient notice of a probability of harm to an inmate to render the state
liable for his death as a result of his attempt to intercede in behalf of another
inmate being subjected to heinous personal treatment by two other inmates.
Louisiana jurisprudence has uniformly held 5 that while the peniten-
tiary is not an insurer of the safety of its inmates, liability may be found
when it is shown that the authorities knew or had reason to anticipate that
harm would ensue and then failed to use reasonable care in preventing the
14. 326 So. 2d 481 (La. 1976).
15. Parker v. State, 282 So. 2d 483 (La. 1973); Nedd v. State, 281 So. 2d 131 (La.
1973); Raney v. State, 322 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975); Craft v. State, 308 So.
2d 290 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975); Bastida v. State, 269 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1972); Adams v. State, 247 So. 2d 149 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); St. Julian v. State, 98
So. 2d 284 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
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harm. Under this standard, the state was cast in judgment in only one
previous appellate case.16
The Louisiana Supreme Court in the instant case found both that there
was reason to anticipate the harm to Breaux and that prison personnel did not
use reasonable care to prevent the harm- after being put on notice of its
probability. Significantly the court found it unnecessary to consider another
potential basis for liability, that the state failed to provide a sufficient
number of guards and security arrangements to assure reasonable safety to
the inmates under its custody.
The case does not so much reflect a change in the rule of law applicable
as it does a change in the court's willingness to let the facts satisfy the rule.
ABOLITION OF INVITEE-LICENSEE-TRESPASSER CATEGORIES
The court in Cates v. Beauregard Electric Cooperative, Inc., said,
"We find the common law classifications of invitee-licensee-trespasser
to be of little help in applying C.C. 2315." 1 The court thus continued its
reinforcement of the duty-risk tort analysis by abandoning the traditional
categories applied to premises liability cases.
In Cates plaintiff was horseback riding with a friend on defendant's
rural property when he climbed a pole to reach the electric wire at the top and
was horribly injured upon touching the wire, which was still energized. The
decision to abandon the traditional categories was not material to the
analysis of the case, because the court found the plaintiff contributorily
negligent regardless of the duty owed to him, so that the precise duty owed
by the landowner became irrelevant.
England abandoned the distinction between invitees and licensees by
statute in 1957. 8 The change in England did not, however, affect the
tresspasser category. The statutory duty in England is the "common duty of
care" to all visitors. The duty of care then varies according to the
circumstances.
The category approach was thus rejected by its founding jurisdiction
after a troublesome time for the English courts from the 19th century until
1957. The writings criticizing the rigid category approach to premises
liability speak laudably of the law of France,' 9 which handles the problem
16. St. Julian v. State, 98 So.2d 284 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957). Justice Tate wrote
the opinion in St. Julian and in the instant case but dissented in the two supreme court
decisions finding no liability.
17. 328 So. 2d 367, 370 (La. 1976).
18. Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957 5 & 6 Eliz. 2 C.31.
19. Hughes, Duties to Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and Revaluation, 68
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either under something akin to strict liability under article 1384 of the
French Civil Code, or under the ordinary concept of fault-negligence
under articles 1382 and 1383.
Rhode Island,2 0 Hawaii 2 Colorado, E District of Columbia 23 and
Massachusetts 24 all have abolished the categories. Our courts will certainly
have a much needed enhanced flexibility to do justice under the circum-
stances without the necessity of satisfying the ancient, rigid category
requirements.
If the Louisiana court excises this body of common law the logical
replacement for it will be the law of French origin reflected in our Civil Code
article 2317. The French Civil Code generally has treated premises liability
either as a matter of negligence under article 1382; or liability without
negligence-fault under article 1384, where one is responsible for harms
caused by things under his control, of which he is the guardian; or under
article 1386, which makes the owner of a building liable for harm caused by
the ruin of the building. Clearly the jurists of the French courts have woven
this fabric of jurisprudence; it was not written as such by the redactors of the
French Civil Code. Judicial sparks of ingenuity in the interpretation and
application of the Civil Code have charted the path of the French law, just as
the ingenuity of the American common law courts and of the Louisiana
courts has fashioned our law. It is this writer's judgment that Louisiana will
fare better under the reasonable man, duty-risk, approach under article 2315
than under the provision of article 2317, making one responsible for
damages caused by the vice of things under his control.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-REDHIBITION-PROOF OF DEFEcr
The action of redhibition has by no means merged into delictual law but
the elements of proof in some respects are so similar that the case of
Moreno's Inc. v. Lake Charles Catholic High Schools, Inc. 25 should be
discussed here.
Two air conditioning units installed in the school failed after two and a
half years of operation. The original installer replaced the compressors and
sued the school upon its refusal to pay for the replacements. The school in
YALE L.J. 633, 672 (1959); Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees,
Licensees, and Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REV. 182, 359 (1953).
20. Mariorenzi v. Di Ponte, 333 A.2d 127 (R.I. 1975).
21. Pickard v. City of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 121, 452 P.2d 445 (1969).
22. Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Col. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971).
23. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
24. Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973).
25. 315 So. 2d 660 (La. 1975).
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turn filed a third party demand in redhibition against the Trane manufacturer
of the units, based upon Louisiana Civil Code article 2503, by which the
school claimed subrogation to itself of the implied warranty of fitness owed
by Trane to the installer of the units. To recover in its third party demand,
the school had to show that the compressors contained a hidden vice at the
time of the sale. The evidence supporting the school's claim consisted solely
of a showing that installation and maintenance was proper and that a unit of
this type should not fail so soon when its manufacturers testified that the unit
was designed to work satisfactorily for ten years.
On the foregoing facts alone, the supreme court said, "Failure of the
compressor, then, by clear implication, was due to mechanical failure,
which in the absence of proof of other causes, would more properly be
attributed to faulty manufacture. 26 The court then explicitly stated that the
plaintiff had discharged his burden to prove defect by bringing forward
circumstantial evidence from which a logical inference of defect could be
made.
The mode of proof by which the plaintiff discharged his burden in this
case of redhibition is precisely parallel to the mode allowed to the plaintiff in
the landmark products liability-negligence action of Weber v. Fidelity &
Casualty Insurance Co. ,27 in which the supreme. court found that the
chemical dip applied to cattle was proved defective upon a showing that it
had been used according to the directions on the container and that since the
cattle receiving the dip thereafter died, a logical inference could be drawn
that the dip itself was defective.
Stripped of all else, both Weber and Moreno's found proof of defect in
a showing of failure of performance together with a reasonable showing of
proper use. The resulting rule probably can be described as requiring the
production of a preponderance of evidence showing reasonable use and
failure of the product to shift the burden to the manufacturer to show that
there was some cause other than the defect that brought about the failure.
The court, as a further interesting observation, found this compressor
unit actionably defective after two and a half years of operation, even
though the contractual warranty by the manufacturer was limited to one
year. In effect, because Trane's engineers testified that the unit was
designed to operate for ten years, the court accorded to the school a ten year
warranty of fitness. Query: The usual warranty on the picture tube of
television sets is limited to one year. If an engineering expert from a
26. Id. at 663.
27. 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971).
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television manufacturer testified that television tubes are designed to
operate for ten years, would consumers, i.e., television set purchasers,
have actions against television sellers when the tube fails after three years of
operation?
SLIP AND FALL CASES-BURDEN SHIFTED TO STORE OWNER
The Louisiana Supreme Court applied a new rule in two slip and fall
cases in self-service grocery stores, Kavlich v. Kramer28 and Gonzales v.
Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc.29 The court said that upon the plaintiff's
showing that the fall is caused by the presence of a foreign substance on the
floor of the store, the burden shifts to the defendant to exculpate itself from
the presumption that it was negligent.
Prior to Kavlich and Gonzales, the law was generally stated as
follows: A successful plaintiff must establish: (1) that a dangerous condition
was created or maintained by the storekeeper or one of his employees; or (2)
if not created by the storekeeper or one of his employees that (a) the
storekeeper or one of his employees did actually have knowledge of the
dangerous conditions or (b) "the dangerous condition had remained long
enough for the storekeeper to have had constructive knowledge that said
condition existed.' '30
It is safe to say that plaintiffs more often than not lost the slip and fall
cases under the prior rule because traditionally the storekeeper showed that
he periodically swept or inspected and had discharged his duty of reasonable
care. Clearly penetration of the storekeeper's defense was nearly impossible
for a plaintiff.
Kavlich and Gonzales change this barrier. Now, while the storekeeper
has the defense of showing that he took reasonable protective measures,
including periodic inspections to keep the aisles and floors free of sub-
stances or objects which might cause a customer to fall, a routine showing of
periodic sweeping will probably not be deemed a sufficient discharge of the
duty. This is not to say that the opportunity for defense is not a real one. It
does give the court the opportunity in the future to demand more and greater
inspections, thus rendering fewer and fewer the cases the plaintiffs will lose
in this type of action.
Viewing the broad trend of the tort jurisprudence of the court in recent
28. 315 So. 2d 282 (La. 1975).
29. 326 So. 2d 486 (La. 1976). For a more detailed discussion see Note, 37 LA. L.
REV. 634 (1977).
30. See, e.g., Calamari v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 300 So. 2d 653 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1974).
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years, the instant cases seem to be additional examples of the move toward
liability without negligence fault. At common law it might well be called
strict liability. The result may be achieved by imposing upon the defendant,
according to the endeavor involved, a high standard of care, res ipsa
loquitur, presumption of fault, or the shifting of the burden of going forward
with the evidence, as was done in the instant cases. Changing the ease or
difficulty with which one reaches the preponderance of proof to show
causation or discharge of reasonable care may also be used to move the
claim effectively toward liability without negligence-fault.
CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 667-PRESCRIPTION
In a scholarly decision terminating a long-simmering dispute, the court
in Dean v. Hercules, Inc. ,"1 held that the prescriptive period applicable to a
claim for damages under Civil Code article 667 is the one-year period
prescribed by Civil Code article 3536.
In its fully documented opinion, the court essentially concluded that
since an action for damages for a violation of article 667 is very similar to an
action for damages for a violation of article 2315, the prescriptive period for
the one should be the same as for the other. While the court noted with
approval its prior decision in Langlois,32 where a violation of article 667 or
669 is considered fault within the contemplation of article 2315, so that
damages are actually claimed and collected under the general tort article,
rather than under articles 667 or 669, it seems that the instant opinion holds
that the obligation to pay damages is conferred directly by article 667, rather
than by article 2315. With its approval of Langlois33 the court is certainly
free to say later that the obligation to pay damages in a case like the instant
one arises from article 2315, rather than from article 667.
It is crucial to make the foregoing distinction and to found the
obligation on article 2315 because the survival and wrongful death actions,
it may be argued with disturbing force, are limited to offenses and
quasi-offenses under article 2315, and do not flow from any other obligation
source. This point was raised by the writer in connection with an action for
damages in redhibition and products liability, but the question has yet to be
presented to the courts for resolution. The problem has its foundation in the
early line of cases 34 holding that the survival and wrongful death concepts
31. 328 So. 2d 69 (La. 1976).
32. Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
33. Crawford, Products Liability-The Cause of Action, 22 LA. B.J. 239 (1975).
34. See Voss, The Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Death, at Common Law,
at Civil Law, and in Louisiana, 6 TUL. L. REv. 201 (1932).
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were not part of the law of damages under the Louisiana Civil Code and
which resulted in the elaborate amending of article 2315. The question is
rendered even more important by the implicit approval of the court in the
instant case of the notion that article 667 encompasses liability for personal
injuries and for movable property. The problem is nonexistent as long as
articles 667 and 669 are treated in actions for damages as standards of care
for the determination of fault under article 2315.
